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Violations of the absolute priority rule (APR) are commonplace in private workouts, 
formal business reorganizations, and personal bankruptcies.  While some theorists 
suggest that these might arise endogenously, they are clearly magnified by the 
institutional structure of the bankruptcy code. This paper shows that APR violations 
exacerbate credit rationing problems by reducing the payment lenders receive in default 
states. Furthermore, APR violations make default more likely, raising the interest rate 
that firms must pay when borrowing. Both of these problems arise even when APR 
violations have no impact on the borrower's incentive to undertake risk-shifting behavior. 
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The absolute priority rule (APR) is the theoretical standard by which financial contracts 
are resolved  when a  debtor is unable to repay  all of  his  creditors.  Simply stated, this rule 
requires that the debtor receive no value from his assets until all of his creditors have been repaid 
in full.'  While this rule would seem quite simple to implement, it is routinely circumvented in 
practice. 
Violations of  the APR in Chapter 11 reorganizations are well documented.  Studies by 
Betker (1995), Franks and Torous (1991), and LoPucki and Whitford (1990) have shown that 
stockholders of publicly traded companies that have gone through reorganizations receive value 
about 75 percent of  the time, even though their creditors are not paid the full value of  their 
claims.  The magnitude of these deviations is not small.  Eberhart, Moore, and Roenfeldt (1990) 
find  that the firm's  original equityholders retain 7.6 percent of  the firm's value on averageV2 
APR violations are not limited solely to corporate bankruptcies.  Chapter 5 of  the Bankruptcy 
Code allows individual debtors generous exemptions to protect personal property from their 
~reditors.~  In addition, bankruptcy eliminates most claims on a debtor's future wage income, 
thereby limiting creditors' access to what is typically his most valuable asset:  his human capital. 
Clearly, the Bankruptcy Code provides implicit support for these violations in some cases 
and explicit statutory authority for them in others. But whether or not they are beneficial remains 
The APR also states that more senior creditors should be paid before junior creditors. In this paper, 
we  consider only APR violations between the borrower and  a (single) lender. 
Betker (1995) and Franks and Torous (1994) find these deviations to be somewhat smaller -2.86 
percent and 2.3 percent, respectively. 
11 U.S.C.  $522. 
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negative consequences. Indeed, many recent proposals for amending current banlauptcy law are 
motivated  by  the belief that the frequent APR violations inherent in the current system are 
undesirable."  But this view that the APR should be sacrosanct is by  no means universal. 
We contribute to this discussion by  showing that APR violations make credit rationing 
problems more severe, since they make lenders less able to offer loans to high-risk borrowers. 
Furthermore, APR violations make default more likely, increasing the interest rate borrowers 
must pay when raising funds.  Both of these problems arise even when APR violations have no 
impact on the borrower' s incentive to undertake risk-shifting behavior. 
The traditional model of credit rationing was developed by  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and 
focused on borrowers'  adverse selection and moral hazard problems.5  Williamson (1986, 1987) 
showed that credit rationing could exist even without these problems, relying instead on the 
costly state verification framework used in this article.  Each of these models of  credit rationing 
focuses on a market made up of many borrowers; in this world, credit rationing means that some 
borrowers are denied loans even though they are indistinguishable from those who do receive 
loans. 
Since we use a costly state verification environment, our model most closely resembles 
that of Williamson (1987).  Credit rationing occurs in Williamson's model because lenders have 
different reservation returns, giving him an upward-sloping supply function for loans.  In our 
model, however, there is only one borrower.  One advantage to this approach is that it shows the 
See Roe (1983), Bebchuk (1988), and Aghion, Hart, and Moore (1992). 
See also Gale (1990) and  Calomiris and Hubbard (1990). 
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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9513.pdfessential  similarity  between  a  borrower  who  is  credit  rationed  and  one  who  is  "credit 
constrained."  A credit-constrained borrower is one who cannot obtain as large a loan as he might 
in a perfect capital market with no informational asymmetries.  For example, a consumer might 
be forced to buy a smaller house or a less expensive car, or a business owner might be unable 
to finance as much  inventory as he would like to  (and be able to if  APR violations  did not 
occur).  It should be clear, however, that if  we were to posit Williamson's  structure for the 
supply side of the loan market, the credit rationing in our model would be identical to that which 
he develops. 
The next section briefly reviews recent research  on the impact of  APR violations  on 
financial contracts.  Then, in  section 3, we analyze APR violations in a  simple costly state 
verification model.  We show that these violations cause the borrower to have a lower expected 
return ex ante because they increase the probability of  default.  In section 4, we show that credit 
rationing problems are more severe when APR violations are greater; that is, some loans that 
might be made when APR violations do not occur in default states will not be made when they 
do.  We conclude in section 5. 
2.  Other Views on the APR 
Bulow and Shoven (1978) and White (1980, 1983) were among the first to question the 
efficiency of  APRS.~  They show that when a firm is in financial distress, the APR generally 
leads to inefficient investment and liquidation-continuation decisions.  In particular, the APR 
leads to an underinvestment problem, because equityholders can renegotiate their bank debt but 
See also the later extensions by Gertner and Scharfstein (1991). 
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only to bondholders, the fm has no incentive to undertake them.  Berkovitch and Israel (1991) 
examine the over- and under-investment problems resulting from financial distress in more detail, 
and  show  that  APR  violations  allow  the  firm  to  renegotiate  its  debt  efficiently, thereby 
eliminating any perverse investment incentives.  Eberhart and  Senbet (1993) argue that APR 
violations  act  to  reduce  the  risk-shifting incentives of  a  firm in  financial distress:  Since 
shareholders receive a portion of the firm's revenues even in default, they have less incentive to 
take risky  actions that  might  reduce this value.  Together, these papers  suggest that  APR 
violations increase efficiency, ex post. 
But while these papers might explain why  the firm's equityholders and creditors might 
find APR violations attractive once the firm is in financial distress, they ignore their impact on 
ex ante efficiency, i.e., the firm's expected profits at the time of the initial financial contracting. 
Here, opinions are more divided.  Bebchuk (1991) focuses on the risk-shifting problem at this 
initial stage.  Since APR violations allow shareholders to receive some value even when the firm 
is in default, they have an increased incentive to undertake negative net present value projects 
that entail high risk.  Eberhart and Sweeney (1994) find that between 30 and 85 percent of  the 
noise in the market for bankrupt firms' bonds may be attributable to APR violations, and thus 
conclude that APR violations are detrimental because they add greater uncertainty to the security 
valuation process.  Finally, Rajan and Winton (1994) argue that a bank's ability to perfect liens 
against a debtor's  assets provides it with an incentive to perform its monitoring duties early - 
if the bank waits too long, its liens may be considered a "voidable preference" under 5547 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, thereby depriving the bank of any priority status.  Here, violations of the APR 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9513.pdfhave negative consequences on  ex ante efficiency, since they reduce the incentive for bank 
lenders to monitor early. 
Countering these views is a group of papers proposing that APR violations have beneficial 
ex ante effects. For example, Harris and Raviv (1993) argue that selecting an optimal bankruptcy 
procedure is an extension of  the optimal contracting problem.  They analyze several different 
state-independent bankruptcy procedures and show that they are all dominated by  a contract in 
which a bankruptcy court may impose forgiveness in high-cost-of-liquidation states, suggesting 
that APR violations are ex ante efficient. Longhofer (1994) looks at how bankruptcy rules affect 
the incentives for lenders to monitor a firm's behavior and suggests that anticipated ex post APR 
violations are valuable to the extent that they punish senior lenders (those designated to monitor 
1 
the firm's behavior) for failing to detect a misbehaving firm.  Finally, Bebchuk and Picker (1993) 
propose that APR  violations reduce the incentive of  an  ownerlmanager to  select inefficient 
"insider"  projects whose values  are highly  dependent on  the manager's  personal skills, and 
encourage the ownerlmanager to invest in his own human capital.  Both of these effects suggest 
that APR violations are ex ante beneficial. 
All of these papers, however, deal with moral hazard problems of  one sort or another; 
whether or not APR violations are beneficial depends on which problem the firm faces at the 
time of  the initial contracting.  In what follows, we show that APR violations need  have no 
impact on the firm's ex ante investment decision, either directly by affecting its risk incentives, 
or indirectly by  changing the lender's incentives to monitor the firm.  Instead, APR violations 
make credit rationing more likely:  The more the debtor receives in default states, the lower the 
threshold at which increases in the interest rate reduce the lender's expected return. Furthermore, 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9513.pdfwe  demonstrate that APR violations also reduce social welfare by  making default, which is 
costly, more likely to occur. 
3.  A Model with Debt and APR Violations 
Consider  a  risk-neutral  economic  actor  living  in  a  two-period  world.  We  may 
alternatively think of  this actor as an individual consumer or  as a firm.  In the first case, we 
assume that the individual has some random income in period two, but wishes to consume some 
good that costs I  in the first period; this good might be education, a house, a car, or some other 
consumer good.  In the second case, we can think of  the firm as having some project in which 
it can invest I in the first period to obtain a random return in period two.  In either case, the 
agent dies at the end of period two, and the good/investrnent chosen in period one has no residual 
value.  In what follows, we will use the "firm"  terminology, but it should be clear that either 
interpretation would work equally well. 
Since the firm has no initial endowment, it must raise funds from an outside investor. 
We will assume a costly state verification environment (Townsend [I9791 and Gale and Hellwig 
[1985]), letting c be the ex post cost of state verification.  As a consequence, debt is the optimal 
financial ~ontract.~  Let 6 denote the  gross payment (principal and interest) due the investor 
(henceforth called the lender) in period 2; for ease of  exposition, we will o2ten refer to 6 as "the 
interest rate."  In addition, assume that the market of  potential lenders is perfectly competitive, 
that all lenders are risk neutral, and that the riskless rate of  interest is one, so that all lenders 
Strictly  speaking,  we  are  assuming  that  state  verification is  perfect  and  that  it  occurs  in  a 
deterministic manner.  If  stochastic verification is allowed, the simple debt contract will not, in general, 
be optimal (see Townsend [I9791 and Border and Sobel [1987]).  We will discuss the implications of  this 
assumption in section 5. 
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Let x denote the project's return in period two and n(x) be the distribution function for 
x; as is standard, denote the density function by  ~(x),  which is strictly positive on its support 
[z, XI . To make the problem interesting (i.e., to have some risk involved), assume I > x.  - Since 
we are interested in the impact of APR violations, let y  denote the payment the borrower receives 
in  default  states.  Finally,  to  avoid  unlimited  liability  problems  for  the  investor,  assume 
X  -  > C +y. 
The borrower's expected return is then 
The lender's expected return is 
DEFINITION:  A  competitive equilibrium in this market  is defined by an interest rate  6'  that 
maximizes the borrower's expected return subject to the constraint that the lender earns 
zero expected profits, 
and subject to the borrower's expected return being non-negative. 
Technically speaking, there is always an autarkic equilibrium in which no lending occurs.  In this 
equilibrium, 6 may take any value, since it  .is never offered to the borrower. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9513.pdfEquilibrium is characterized by the following proposition: 
PROPOS~ION  1:  In any  competitive equilibrium in which lending  takes place,  the  lender's 
expected return is non-decreasing in the face  value of the debt (i.e., L,(6*,I,  y) 2 0) and 
the  borrower's  expected  return is non-increasing in the face  value of  the  debt  (i.e., 
B,(6*, y) I  0). Lending will occur in equilibrium only when the cost of state verification, 
c, and the payment  to the firm  in default, y,  are suflciently small. 
Proof:  Direct differentiation of  (1) and (2) verifies that 
and 
These conditions provide the required upper bound on c and y,  and imply that B (6,y) will be 
decreasing in 6 -whenever  L (  6, I,  y)  is increasing in 6. 
Suppose there exists a 6* that satisfies the definition of  an equilibrium interest rate, but 
that  L,(a8,1,y) < 0.  We  will  show  that  this  cannot  occur:  Either  there  exists  some 
6'  E  (x,6*)  -  such that L(6',I,y)  = 0, B,(6/,y) I 0, L,(6/,I,y)  2 0, and B(6/,y) 2  B(6*,y), 
or there is no lending in equilibrium. 
If no  6'  such that L,(6/,I,y)  2 0 and L (6/,I,y) = 0 were to exist, we would have 
which is a contradiction, since I > x;  in this case, we have the autarkic equilibrium.  If  such a 
6/  does exist, the fact that B,(6/,y) I 0 follows immediately from (4) and (5) above.  Finally, 
8 
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Thus, B (6' ,y) -  B (a*,  y)  = c (II(6*) -  II(6'))  2 0,  since 6* 2 6'.  Thus, B (6/,y) 2 B (a*,  y).  (I, 
This proposition implies that if multiple choices of 6 satisfy L(6,I,  y)  = 0,  then the smallest such 
6 will be the equilibrium. 
Of course, when a lending equilibrium exists, the APR violations that will occur in default 
states will be anticipated.  As a consequence, the borrower must pay a premium ex ante; i.e.,  he 
must pay a higher interest rate.  One might imagine that the borrower's  expected return  in 
bankruptcy states would exactly cancel his expected added interest costs.  This, however, is not 
the case.  To see this, note that the impact of an increase in y on the borrower's expected return 
is 
To calculate the change in the debt payments due to an increase in the APR violation, we totally 
differentiate (3): 
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The denominator of  this expression is the change in the  lender's expected return due to  an 
increase in the face value of  the debt, and is positive by Proposition 1.  The numerator is clearly 
negative, showing that the borrower's expected return is decreasing in y. 
This fact is an immediate consequence of  the optimality of  simple debt in a costly state 
verification environment, and its intuition is straightforward.  Violations of the APR reduce the 
lender's expected return from default states.  As a consequence, the lender must receive a larger 
payment in nondefault states, i.e., the face value of  the debt must be larger to maintain the zero 
profit constraint.  But a larger face value for the debt means that default will occur more often, 
which implies its deadweight costs will be incurred more often as well.  Notice that if c, the 
deadweight cost of  state verification, were zero, then the level of y would have no impact on the 
borrower's expected return.  But, of course, simple debt would no longer be the optimal financial 
contract if this were the case. 
Because ex post state verification is costly, the results of  Townsend (1979) and Gale and 
Hellwig (1985) assure us that debt is, in fact, the best way for the investor to advance funds to 
the  firm.  And  as a consequence when lending occurs in equilibrium, the existence of  APR 
violations, while beneficial ex post for a borrower in default, actually reduces the borrower's ex 
ante expected return.  The next logical question, then, is how APR violations affect the lender's 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9513.pdfwillingness to make loans in equilibrium, i.e.,  whether they  change the likelihood  of  credit 
rationing.  It is to this question we turn in the next section. 
4.  APR Violations and Credit Rationing 
A  necessary  starting point  for  our  analysis  is  to  define  what  we  mean  by  "credit 
rationing."  Simply stated, credit rationing occurs whenever excess demand for credit remains in 
the market in equilibrium.  Since the market is in equilibrium, by definition there is no pressure 
for the interest rate to increase to clear the market, as is the case in the classical Walrasian 
model.  In our model, credit rationing means that no lender is willing to provide the firm's 
required investment because the interest rate cannot rise enough to ensure that his zero profit 
constraint (3) is satisfied. 
Why can't this occur? The deadweight loss imposed by state verification and the transfer 
due to the APR violation reduce the lender's  expected return in default  states.  Eventually, 
increases in the interest rate make default so likely that these costs outweigh the higher return 
the lender expects to receive in nondefault states.  Figure 1 shows L graphed as a function of 6, 
holding I and y constant.  As 6 gets larger, L eventually slopes downward.' 
Define 8 as  the  interest rate  that  maximizes the lender's  expected  return  given  the 
Note  that L is not necessarily  a concave function of  6.  All  of  our results, however, hold  true 
regardless of the shape of L. 
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Since increases in I cause L(6,I,y) to shift down vertically, we can defme T(y)  as the largest 
investment that is feasible for the lender to finance:  L,)  = 0.  Totally differentiating this 
- 
expression with respect to I  and y gives us 
Notice that 8 is not a function of I, because changes in I are merely vertical shifts of  L(6,I,  y); such 
shifts do not change the location of the extremum, 8, only the value of  the function at the extremum. 
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PROPOS~ION  2:  Larger APR violations increase the magnitude of  credit rationing by reducing 
the size of  the largest project  that will allow lenders to earn non-negative expected profits. 
Figure 1 illustrates the effects summarized in Proposition 2.  Holding I constant, an increase in 
y shifts L down and to the left.''  As a result, loans that will be made when the APR violation 
is yl  will not be made when the APR violation is increased to y, -  the resulting decrease in the 
lender's  expected return makes loans of I, infeasible.  The largest loan a lender is willing to 
make is, instead, I,  < I,. 
5.  Conclusions 
In this article, we have demonstrated that APR violations can exacerbate credit rationing 
problems.  By lowering the lender's expected return and increasing the cost of default, deviations 
from the APR make fewer loans profitable for lenders.  To the extent that existing bankruptcy 
law makes APR violations more likely and makes bankruptcy more costly, our results imply that 
they make credit rationing problems more intense.'' 
lo  Technically, this leftward shift depends on the concavity of L with respect to 6.  In this case, it is 
proven by totally differentiating the first-order condition that defines 8.  Our results, however, depend 
only on the downward shift, which occurs regardless of  whether L is concave in 6. 
l1 See Bebchuk and  Chang  (1992) and  Brown  (1989) for theoretical models suggesting that the 
structure of Chapter 11 does, in fact, make APR violations more severe. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9513.pdfThis is particularly a problem with respect to loans for individual consumers.  As noted 
before, individual debtors may violate the APR unilaterally by "exempting"  some of their assets 
from the property of  the estate.  Although the Code allows states to opt out of  this provision, 
individuals may exempt property listed in §522(d) of  the Code, or if  their state allows more 
generous exemptions, they may follow the state's rules instead.  Assets that are typically exempt 
under both state and federal law include an interest in a house, automobile, jewelry, clothing, and 
other personal possessions; the total value of  such assets generally varies from state to state.'' 
This variance in the level of  allowed exemptions may provide a means of  testing the 
conclusions reached in this paper.  In particular, the results above suggest that consumers in 
states that allow more generous exemptions would, ceteris paribus, pay higher interest rates and 
be offered less consumer credit than would borrowers who live in states with smaller exemptions. 
This paper has also pointed out that APR violations can be inefficient ex ante even when 
they have no impact on a borrower's investment incentives.  This insight becomes particularly 
important when one considers consumer applications of  the model.  In these cases, the typical 
moral hazard story in which the borrower must choose the distribution of future revenues makes 
little sense.  Since most  conclusions about the efficiency or  inefficiency of  APR  violations 
depend on these moral hazard models, they are most relevant when the borrower is a fm.  In 
contrast, the optimality of  the simple debt contract in a costly state verification environment 
implies  that  APR  violations  have  negative  ex  ante  consequences for  both  businesses  and 
individual borrowers. 
l2 One notable state is Texas, whose homestead law exempts a rural family home of up to two hundred 
acres regardless of  worth.  See Weintraub and Resnick (1992), fl 4.07. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9513.pdfOur analysis must be considered with at least one caveat.  Boyd and Smith (1993) also 
note that adherence to the APR can be thought of  as nonstochastic monitoring in a costly state 
verification  environment.13  In contrast,  the  optimal  contract  when  stochastic  monitoring  is 
allowed typically involves some element of  debt forgiveness -  i.e.,  a violation of  the APR, 
similar to that proposed by Harris and Raviv (1993).  Since we have selected a costly state 
verification framework for our model, at least one of the theoretical benefits of  APR violations 
is present.  A more comprehensive model would measure the relative costs we develop here with 
the benefits of  stochastic state verification to evaluate the true impact of  APR violations.  Our 
primary conclusions about APR violations and credit rationing, however, are unaffected by this 
issue. 
l3 Boyd and Smith point out that the APR and nonstochastic monitoring are not strictly synonymous. 
Rather, they "associate an absolute priority rule with nonstochastic monitoring because -  if stochastic 
monitoring were easy to implement -  there would be no reason to have an interest in absolute priority 
rules in this environment" (Boyd and Smith [1993], footnote 4). 
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